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**DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS ON VIETNAM**

**CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services  
23 September 1963**

The Director said there did not appear to be any cohesive military group capable of ousting the Diem regime, and further that there appeared to be no replacement for the then current regime which was capable of running the government. A new regime probably would be no better. Consequently, the Agency was urging a cautious, slow approach to the problem.

**Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
10 October 1963**

"We have not seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively would be an improvement over Diem. Therefore, it has been our counsel that we must proceed cautiously, otherwise a situation might flare up which might result in something of a civil war, and the communists would come out the victor merely by sitting on the sidelines."

**Far East Subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs  
23 October 1963**

A successful coup may or may not be an improvement, and discouragement was indicated over the possibility of the Diem regime reforming its ways and regaining the confidence of the people. On the other hand, there seemed to be no replacement government waiting in the wings and the generals for the most part had no political experience. Hence it might be assumed that some protracted period of political confusion would result from a coup, and the effect that this might have on the future of the war could not be determined.

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**CIA Subcommittees of Senate Armed Services and  
Senate Appropriations Committees  
29 October 1963**

**No statement regarding future prospects of the war in  
Vietnam noted in the Memorandum for the Record.**

**Briefings of Senators Russell and Saltonstall  
1 November 1963**

**In reporting on the coup then in progress and its effect on  
the war, the Director indicated that a structure had been built to  
prosecute the war and political events in the city had not yet signifi-  
cantly affected the war. It was not expected that the war would  
collapse because of the coup, noting it had not been the CIA view  
that the war would fail if Diem stayed in power.**

**CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations  
6 November 1963**

**Regarding the specific circumstances of the coup, the Director  
noted that the political situation would have to be watched most care-  
fully and inevitably there would be considerable confusion for a time.  
No specific remarks were noted with regard to the general future  
situation. At that time it was not known what kind of new government  
would come forth.**

**CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services  
7 November 1963**

**Same as 6 November 1963.**

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